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Abstract 
Benchmarking has long been a central component of the global development industry, with 
the most prominent recent initiative being the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
framework. However, within existing scholarship, the agent-level interactions surrounding the 
MDG framework remain under-explored. Here, on the back of an analysis of interactions that 
took place within and around key MDG review summits, I develop a typology to clarify the 
intersection of benchmarking and blame games. Overall, I demonstrate that despite the efforts 
of the MDG architects to insulate the initiative, blame games have permeated SROLF\PDNHUV¶
engagements with the framework. Moreover, the content of these blame games have been 
carried over into the recently outlined Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). A pattern of 
strategic clarification has seen the emergence within this follow-on SDG framework of more 
precise responsibilities on higher-income states to meet aid targets, and on lower-income 
states to meet governance reform targets. Given the deeply-embedded cleavages that were 
evident in UN review summits, similar blame games seem likely to follow the periodic 
HYDOXDWLRQVZLWKLQWKH6'*V¶OLIHVSDQ 
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Introduction 
The desire to boil the ungovernable complexity of the social world down to a series of 
manageable proxy-measures seems to be a ubiquitous feature of life in and around the modern 
state. In many cases the demand from state agencies for ever greater flows of data was 
initially linked to practices of war-making, with reliable information needed to guide the 
movement of standing armies and supplies, and the levying of taxes to fund these operations.1 
Over time, with the expanding reach of governing structures into other policy areas, the 
creation of data flows has proliferated. It is now standard practice for states to collate 
indicators on a wide range of demographic trends, forms of economic activity, the 
performance of education and healthcare systems, and many other areas.2 And while the 
instruments of the modern state may have enjoyed something of a head-start, international 
organisations are now working hard to reproduce this quantification of the social world on a 
global scale. Although transformations across other areas of global governance have been 
dramatic,3 it is perhaps in the realm of development that benchmarking practices are at their 
most extensive.4  
Through this paper I focus on the Millennium Development Goal framework, which 
represents arguably the most prominent attempt to benchmark global development. The 
Millennium Development Goals were launched at the end of 2001, with an unprecedented 
number of heads of state signalling their support through a period of high-profile United 
Nations summitry. The performance of the international community as a whole through the 
early 2000s was, it was suggested, to be assessed by evaluating the extent to which the lot of 
                                                     
1
 Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 956-1005; 
James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 11-33. 
2
 Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (Oxford: University Press, 1997). 
3
 Citations to special issue contributions; Lorenzo Fioramonti, How Numbers Rule the World (London: 
=HG/RUHQ]R)LRUDPRQWLµ$3RVW-*'3:RUOG:K\,W¶V7LPe To End The Tyranny of Gross 
'RPHVWLF3URGXFW¶Foreign Policy 2nd June, 2015. Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/02/a-
post-gdp-world/. Accessed 8th June, 2015. 
4
 For detailed insights into the historical origins of benchmarking and statistics in the field of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWVHH+DQV$UQGWµ(FRQRPLF'HYHORSPHQW$6HPDQWLF+LVWRU\¶Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 29:3 (1981), pp.457-66. A significant foundation on which modern 
practices have been built is widely held to have been provided by Eugene Staley, The World Economy 
in Transition (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1939). 
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its lowest income members was improved. The MDGs were introduced as a means of 
assessing the progress achieved in this regard. With its eight Goals and associated indicators 
and time-bound targets, the framework served to establish a multidimensional vision of 
poverty and poverty reduction for the Twenty-First Century. The MDG initiative has been the 
subject of much analysis through its fifteen year lifespan, with a number of works emerging 
DVWKH*RDOV¶FHQVXVSRLQWLVUHDFKHG5 Here, I contribute to this literature by exploring 
the interactions that took place in and around a series of UN reviews of the MDGs.  
Through an analysis of archival records and primary documents, I demonstrate that 
blame games have permeated these MDG-related processes. To conceptually unpack these 
blame games, I develop a typology that classifies the attribution of responsibility within 
benchmarking exercises that differentiates between their design and execution phases. In the 
FDVHRIWKH0'*VWKHIUDPHZRUN¶VDUFKLWHFWVVRXJKWWRSURGXFHDQLQLWLDWLYHthat used diffuse 
lines of responsibility to limit the prevalence of blame games. Developing country 
JRYHUQPHQWV¶ORZOHYHORILQWHJUDWLRQRIWKH*RDOVLQWRGRPHVWLFSROLF\IUDPHZRUNVVHUYHGWR
maintain this opacity. However, UN review summits through 2008 and 2013 saw the 
emergence of prominent attempts to attribute blame for poor performance. A clear cleavage 
emerged between, on the one hand, representatives of developed states who laid primary 
responsibility for under-achievement on the MDGs at the door of developing counWULHV¶
institutional weaknesses, and, on the other, representatives of emerging and developing states 
                                                     
5
 Oxfam, Failing to Deliver: The IMF and the Millennium Development Goals (Washington: Oxfam, 
2003); Dennis Garrity, µ$JURIRUHVWU\DQGWKH$FKLHYHPHQWRIWKH0LOOHQQLXP'HYHORSPHQW*RDOV¶
Agroforestry Systems, 61:1 (2004), pp. 5-$QG\+DLQHVDQG$QGUHZ&DVVHOVµ&DQWKH
Millennium Development Goals be AttDLQHG"¶British Journal of Medicine, 329:7462 (2004), pp. 394-
97; Shalendra Sharma, µ7KH3URPLVHRI0RQWHUUH\0HHWLQJWKH0LOOHQQLXP'HYHORSPHQW*RDOV¶
World Policy Journal, 21:3 (2004), pp. 51-66; Suzanne Akiyama, µ0LOOHQQLXP'HYHORSPHQW*RDOV¶, in 
Naonobu Minato (ed.), New Approaches to Development and Changing Sector Issues (Tokyo: 
Foundation for Advanced Studies in International Development, 2005), pp.34-50; Tamar Gutner, 
µ:KHQ³'RLQJ*RRG´'RHV1RW7KH,0)DQGWKH0LOOHQQLXP'HYHORSPHQW*RDOV¶, in Deborah 
Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan Sell (eds), Who Governs the Globe? (Cambridge: University 
Press, 2010), pp. 266-91; David Hulme and James Scott, µ7KH3ROLWLFDO(FRQRP\RIWKH0'*V
5HWURVSHFWDQG3URVSHFWIRUWKH:RUOG¶V%LJJHVW3URPLVH¶New Political Economy, 15:2 (2010), pp. 
293-306; John McArthur, µ2ZQWKH*RDOV:KDWWKH0LOOHQQLXP'HYHORSPHQW*RDOV+DYH
$FFRPSOLVKHG¶Foreign Affairs, 92:2 (2013), pp. 152-63. 
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who singled out insufficient flows of aid. 6  Through a process of strategic clarification, 
enhanced attention has been placed on these issues within the Sustainable Development Goal 
framework that is in the process of superceding the MDGs.7 Overall, through the paper I 
address the under-examination of agent-level dynamics within the MDG-related literature,8 
and I offer initial reflections on the relationship between benchmarking and blame games to 
the emerging literature on the politics of global benchmarking.    
 In developing this line of analysis, the paper proceeds through the following 
structure. In the opening section, I outline the scope of the conceptual and empirical 
contribution that is made through the paper. I introduce the four-fold typology to clarify the 
intersection between benchmarking and blame games, and provide an overview of the 
primary analysis that underpins this contribution. Through the second section I provide a 
history of the Millennium Development Goals, outlining the capturing of the drafting process 
by a narrow group of UN technocrats, and their layering of diffuse lines of responsibility into 
the design of the MDG framework. I then through the third section review the content 
analysis of MDG summitry and associated policy framework documents, which uncovers the 
ongoing practices of blame shifting through UN fora. This dynamic has seen developed 
country representatives laying responsibility for poor performance at the door of corruption 
and low institutional capacity in developing countries, and developing countries identifying 
                                                     
6
 7KURXJKRXWWKHSDSHUWKHWHUPVµGHYHORSHGFRXQWU\¶DQGµGHYHORSLQJFRXQWU\¶ are used to refer to 
members and non-members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
respectively.   
7
 At the time of writing, the content of the Sustainable Development Goals had been drafted by the 
Open Working Group and reviewed and approved at the close of the 68th Session of the United 
National General Assembly. The final sign-off on the SDGs will take place in September 2015, with 
the UN Secretary General and his Special Advisor on the SDGs predicting overall stability in 
framewoUNFRQWHQW6HH/L])RUGµ6XVWDLQDEOH'HYHORSPHQW*RDOV¶The Guardian Online, 19th 
January. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jan/19/sustainable-
development-goals-united-nations. Accessed 26th March, 2015. Throughout the paper, I use the term 
Sustainable Development Goals to refer to the version approved at the close of the 68th Session, which 
included 17 Goals and around 160 related indicators. 
8
 Amongst the large body of MDG-related literature considered below, patterns of engagement and 
resistance displayed by particular agents in particular fora are explored in most detail by Sakiko 
Fukuda-Parr, µ$UHWKH0'*Va Priority for Development Strategies and Aid Programs? Only Few 
$UH¶International Poverty Center Working Paper Series, No.48 (2008), pp. 1-28; Sakiko Fukuda-
3DUUDQG'DYLG+XOPHµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO1RUP'\QDPLFVDQGµWKH(QGRI3RYHUW\¶8QGHUVWDQGLQJWKH
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)¶Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and 
International Organizations, 17:1 (2011), pp. 17-36. 
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GHYHORSHGFRXQWULHV¶XQPHWDLGFRPPLtments as the key factor inhibiting progress. Strategic 
clarification has come as the MDGs have evolved into the Sustainable Development Goals, 
whose relatively open and inclusive drafting process has led to the incorporation of more 
precisely delineated responsibilities into this follow-on system. Through the concluding 
VHFWLRQRIWKHSDSHU,SURYLGHDEULHIUHFDSLWXODWLRQRIWKHSDSHU¶VFRUHWKHPHVDQGILQGLQJV 
 The exploration of blame games in the world of the MDGs that I provide below 
focuses on statHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶ engagements with the MDG framework that were manifest 
through the 2008 and 2013 UN review summits of the initiative, and through a series of post-
MDG launch Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). This picture is, of course, partial; 
the network of relationships surrounding the MDG framework extended out beyond this 
selection of actors and arenas. International and domestic non-governmental organisations, in 
particular, remained closely hooked-in to the framework, and contributed to the emergence of 
extended blame games that unfolded across multiple levels of governance. 9  While these 
extended blame games sit beyond the central scope of the paper, they represent an important 
subject for future research. Indeed, given the ambitions of the SDG architects to use the post-
2015 framework to push for enhanced domestic accountability processes as a means of 
improving developing-country government performance, these extended blame games look 
set to become increasingly important over time.  
 
Benchmarking and Blame Shifting in Global Development 
In the realm of global development, benchmarks come in many different shapes and sizes. In 
many quarters the GDP measure continues to reign supreme, and has come to be seen as an 
objective yardstick with which to assess the performance of developed and developing 
countries alike. 10  Through the mid-2000s several prominent critical appraisals sought to 
                                                     
9
 See, for example, 'XQFDQ*UHHQµ7KH3RZHURI1XPEHUV:K\WKH0'*V:HUH)ODZHd (And Post-
*RDOV/RRN6HW7R*RWKH6DPH:D\¶Oxfam Blogs (14th August, 2014) available at 
http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/the-power-of-numbers-why-the-mdgs-were-flawed-and-post2015-goals-
look-set-to-go-the-same-way/. Accessed 8th June, 2015. 
10
 The taken-for-grantedness of this conceptualisation amongst groups inside the World Bank, for 
example, is touched upon by several analyses. See Anthony Bebbington, Scott Guggenhein, Elizabeth 
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extend the range of data captured by this narrowly-targeted indicator, with proposals to 
augment the GDP figure with additional measures pertaining to both environmental and social 
factors. 11  Beyond these economistically-centred frameworks, more self-consciously 
multidimensional frameworks have been crafted by agencies of various stripes. These 
frameworks have been created to try to ensure that the way in which we measure and promote 
development includes an explicit focus on education, health, and other measures of living 
standards. The initiatives that can be listed in this regard include the United Nations 
DevelRSPHQW 3URJUDPPH¶V +XPDQ 'HYHORSPHQW ,QGH[ WKH :RUOG (FRQRPLF )RUXP¶V
Gender Gap Index, and, the focus of this paper, the Millennium Development Goals.  
In the paragraphs below I outline the extension offered by this paper to both the 
emerging literature on the politics of global benchmarking, and the MDG-related literature. 
The former body of work offers many valuable insights, exploring both the constitutive and 
relational aspects of benchmarking interventions. By analysing the intersection between 
benchmarking and blame shifting, I in particular engage with works that focus on the 
relational dimension. Within the MDG-related literature, there is a tendency toward exploring 
the constitutive impact of the framework in a way that can obscure the role of agent-led 
contestation. By exploring the detail of agent interactions surrounding the MDGs, I rebalance 
the focus of these works. As is noted in the introduction to this special issue, benchmarks 
represent inescapably political interventions. Here, I draw on the roadmap provided by the 
special issue editors to outline the contribution from this work on the MDGs.  
The first set of properties associated with benchmarking that are flagged up by the 
editors of the special issue serve to highlight the constitutive power of these systems. These 
properties relate to the reification of particular normative standards into observable and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Olson, and Michael Woolcock, µ([SORULQJ6RFLDO&DSLWDO'HEDWHVDWWKH:RUOG%DQN¶Journal of 
Development Studies, 40:5 (2004), pp. 33-64; Liam Clegg, µ2XU'UHDPLVD:RUOd Full of Poverty 
,QGLFDWRUV7KH86WKH:RUOG%DQNDQGWKH3RZHURU1XPEHUV¶New Political Economy, 15:4 (2010), 
pp. 473-92. 
11
 Nicholas Stern, µ7KH(FRQRPLFVRI&OLPDWH&KDQJH¶American Economic Review, 98:2 (2008), pp. 
1-37; Joseph Stiglitz, Armatya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Report by the Committee on the 
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (Paris: INSEE, 2009). More recently, see 
Fioramonti, How Numbers Rule the World)LRUDPRQWLµ$3RVW-*'3:RUOG¶ 
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seemingly objective categorisations, and the commensuration of discrete units into a common 
evaluative metric.12 By providing an authoritative ideal-type template that embodies a set of 
short-hand assumptions about how to understand and address a policy issue, the successful 
dissemination of a benchmark can serve to frame the way in which a community of relevant 
actors perceive significant aspects of their social and political environments. In existing 
literature, it is relatively common for benchmarking systems to be criticised for the blind-
spots they can create in their rises to dominance. By reproducing existing power relations, so 
critics argue, there is a tendency for benchmarking initiatives to crowd-out the perspectives 
and interests of more marginalised agents.  
Prominent contributions to feminist and critical accounting scholarship offer analyses 
that progress along these lines. Literature within this area has, for example, sought to 
highlight the systematic devaluation of social reproduction that has been locked in through 
the rise to dominance of the UN System of National Accounts (SNA) as the core point of 
UHIHUHQFH VKDSLQJ VWDWLVWLFDO DJHQFLHV¶ DWWHPSWV to track economic activity. By excluding 
labour undertaken within the household from its sphere of calculation, the SNA has been said 
to marginalise forms of work predominantly undertaken by females in both the study of 
political economy and the practice of economic management. 13  In a similar vein, the 
Millennium Development Goals themselves have also been attacked for their totalising 
impact. The MDG framework has been criticised, inter alia, for embedding a neo-liberal 
conceptualisation of development, and for rolling out a top-down, technocratic approach that 
leaves little space for substantive input from domestic populations.14 Findings from this paper 
                                                     
12
 (GLWRUVµ*RYHUQLQJWKH:RUOGDWD'LVWDQFH¶-12. 
13
 Marilyn Waring, Counting for Nothing: What Men Value and What Women Are Worth (Toronto: 
UniYHUVLW\RI7RURQWR3UHVV0LFKqOH3XMROµ,QWR7KH0DUJLQ¶LQ(GLWK.XLSHUDQG-RODQGH6DS
(eds) Out of the Margin: Feminist Perspectives on Economics (London: Routledge), pp.17-34. 
14
 Gabay classifies the body of scholarship adopting WKLVVWDQGRQWKH0'*VDVµWKHUHGXFWLRQLVWV¶
&OLYH*DED\µ7KH0LOOHQQLXP'HYHORSPHQW*RDOVDQG$PELWLRXV'HYHORSPHQWDO(QJLQHHULQJ¶Third 
World Quarterly 33:7 (2012), pp.1253-4. Particular works singled out by Gabay include Ashwani 
6DLWKµ)URP8QLYHUVDO9DOXHVWR0LOOHQQLXP'HYHORSPHQW*RDOV/RVWLQ7UDQVLWLRQ¶Development 
and Change 37:6 (2006), 1167-3HJJ\$QWUREXVµ0'*V0RVW'LVWUDFWLQJ *LPPLFNV¶
Convergence 38:3 (2005), pp.49-6DPLU$PLQµ7KH0LOOHQQLXP'HYHORSPHQW*RDOV$&ULWLTXH
IURPWKH6RXWK¶Monthly Review 57:10 (2006), pp.1-9. See also Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Alicia Ely 
Yamin, and Joshua GreensteinµThe Power of Numbers: A Critical Review of Millennium 
Development Goal Targets for Human Development and Human Rights, Journal of Human 
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shed some light on the constitutive side of the MDG process. In particular, by demonstrating 
that the integration of MDG indicators into domestic policy frameworks has remained 
modest, and that contestation of the Goals within reviews remains widespread, I demonstrate 
that the constitutive impact of the MDGs remains relatively limited in the examined fora. 
Discussion over the appropriateness of the Goals, and use of alternative measures of 
development, has continued to feature prominently. It is, however, toward the more relational 
elements of benchmarking interventions that the core engagement from this paper is directed.  
The second set of properties belonging to benchmarking systems that are flagged up 
by the editors in their introduction refer to the relational aspects of these structures. The 
relational impact of benchmarking comes with what the editors refer to as the closing of the 
recursive loop. Through benchmarking interventions, value rankings of an aspect of the social 
world are made, and the recursive loop is completed as benchmarked agents adjust their 
subsequent behaviour. 15  In its most simplified version, a hierarchical and unidirectional 
relationship can be seen to exist between the benchmarker, who designs the framework and 
operationalises the symbolic judgement, and the benchmarkee, who receives the judgement 
and responds accordingly. However, as is outlined elsewhere in the special issue and in the 
wider literature on the politics of global benchmarking, the relational aspects of 
benchmarking interventions can take the form of complex and iterative interactions.16 Guided 
by the interactions observed through MDG review summits and associated processes, and 
drawing on insights from both the existing literature on blame games and on the politics of 
benchmarking, below I present a framework for exploring the intersection of blame games 
and benchmarking interventions.17  
                                                                                                                                                        
Development and Capabilities 15:3 (2014), pp.105-17; Gita Sen and Avanti MukherjeeµNo 
Empowerment without Rights, No Rights without Politics: Gender-equality, MDGs and the post-2015 
Development Agenda¶Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 15:3 (2014), pp.188-202. 
15
 (GLWRUVµ*RYHUQLQJWKH:RUOGDWD'LVWDQFH¶-12. 
16
 Citation to special issue contributions; Sakiko Fukuda-3DUUµ*OREDO*RDOVDVD3ROLF\7RRO,QWHQGHG
DQG8QLQWHQGHG&RQVHTXHQFHV¶Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 15:3 (2014), pp.118-
31. 
17
 It is suggested by Rhodes that by acknowledging an iterative relationship to exist between 
conceptuDOFODULILFDWLRQDQGHPSLULFDOLQYHVWLJDWLRQµRUJDQLVLQJSHUVSHFWLYHV¶FDQEHHVWDEOLVKHG to 
guide our understanding of the social world6HH5RG5KRGHVµ)URP0DUNHWLVDWLRQWR'LSORPDF\,W¶V
WKH0L[WKDW0DWWHUV¶Australian Journal of Public Administration 56:2 (1997), pp.40-53. In this study, 
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To gain analytic traction over the intersection of blame games and benchmarking 
interventions, it is useful to begin by exploring the issue of responsibility. Two distinct 
moments can be identified that shape the nature of the lines of responsibility that become 
embedded within benchmarking interventions. The first of these comes at the benchmarking 
design phase. At this phase, WKH LQWHUYHQWLRQ¶V DUFKLWHFWV FDQRSW WR LGHQWLI\ discrete agents 
with responsibility for the achievement of outcomes, agents who will be rewarded or 
sanctioned in line with benchmarked indicators. Conversely, these architects can design a 
benchmark with less direct lines of responsibility. In such cases, rather than being driven by 
the application of direct material or normative sanctions, any subsequent behavioural change 
will result from more diffuse shifts in beliefs about appropriate standards.18 The second of 
these moments comes through the implementation phase. By virtue of their socially 
negotiated nature, lines of responsibility in the world of benchmarking retain a fluidity that 
outlasts their initially designated structure. As is comprehensively catalogued in the work of 
Christopher Hood and others,19 many strategies are available to agents with which to either 
associate or dissociate themselves from a particular benchmarking exercise.20 Through the 
implementation phase, lines of responsibility can be either clarified or blurred.  
                                                                                                                                                        
an initial review of interactions highlighted the prevalence of blame shifting in MDG review summits, 
and prompted the subsequent drawing together of the work of Christopher Hood and others on this 
topic with other literatures on the politics of global benchmarking.  
18
 Across the field of International Studies, much literature has sought to analytically and empirically 
cut between behavioural change associated with these µORJLFRIFRQVHTXHQFH¶- DQGµORJLFRI
apSURUSLDWHQHVV¶-EDVHGGULYHUV6HHIRUH[DPSOH-DPHV0DUFKDQG-RKDQ2OVHQµ,QVWLWXWLRQDO
3HUVSHFWLYHVRQ3ROLWLFDO,QVWLWXWLRQV¶Governance 9:3 (1996), pp.247-+DUDOG0OOHUµ$UJXLQJ
Bargaining, and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory, and the Logic of 
$SSURSULDWHQHVVLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQV¶European Journal of International Relations 10:3 (2004), 
pp.395-435. These issues are not directly explored in this paper, although there is an implicit 
assumption that, at different times and in different contexts, changes in behaviour brought about by 
benchmarking interventions can be mediated through either form of causal pathway.  
19
 Christopher Hood, The Blame Game: Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-Preservation in Government 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011)&KULVWRSKHU+RRGµWhat Happens When 
Transparency Meets Blame-Avoidance?¶ Public Management Review 9:2 (2007), pp. 191-210. Earlier 
ZRUNRQWKHSROLWLFVRIEODPHLQFOXGH.DWKOHHQ0F*UDZµAvoiding Blame: An Experimental 
Investigation of Political Excuses and Justifications¶ British Journal of Political Science 20:1 (1990), 
pp. 119-131; Kathleen McGraw and Clark Hubbard, µSome of the People Some of the Time: Individual 
Differences in Acceptance of Political Accounts¶LQ'LDQD0XW]3DXO6QLGHUPDQDQG5LFKDUG%URG\
(eds) Political Persuasion and Attitude Change (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 
145-170. 
20
 $OWKRXJKKHUDUHO\XVHVWKHWHUPVµEHQFKPDUN¶DQGµEHQFKPDUNLQJ¶VLJQLILFDQWDVSHFWVRI+RRG¶s 
work reflects on interactions that are in nature similar to those focused on by the editors of this special 
issue. +RRG¶VIDYRXUHGWHUPLQRORJ\ for benchmark-like structures LVµV\QHFGRFKH¶ZKLFKUHIHUVWRWKH
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Given the existence of these two potential starting points and two potential processes 
of evolution, a four-part matrix can be created to capture the intersection between blame 
games and benchmarking processes. This typology is presented in Figure 1. I briefly discuss 
dynamics associated with each mode below, paying particular attention to benchmarking 
interventions in the field of development. 
 
Figure 1: Responsibility in Global Benchmarking 
 
  Responsibility through execution 
  Direct Diffuse 
Responsibility by  
design 
Direct Direct responsibility Strategic blurring 
Diffuse Strategic clarification Diffuse responsibility 
 
 
 The inclusion of direct responsibilities within benchmarking interventions can be 
expected where asymmetric relationships exist between benchmarker and benchmarkee that 
enable the former to lock in their preferences against the contrasting preferences of the latter, 
or where there is a sufficient level of consensus amongst relevant parties. The asymmetric 
version of this mode coheres closely with practices associated with the new public 
management agenda; by collating and publishing a range of performance-related data, 
EHQFKPDUNLQJ V\VWHPV DUH VWUXFWXUHG VR DV WR HQFRXUDJH WKH DVVHVVHG XQLWV WR µXS WKHLU
JDPH¶ 21  The increasing application of this mode of benchmarking in the realm of 
development is particularly associated with the rise to dominance of neo-liberal practices 
through the 1980s.22 In such cases, even if the benchmarkee disputes the legitimacy of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
proxy measurement that is used to gauge performance as a whole. See Gwyn Bevan and Christopher 
+RRGµ:KDW¶V0HDVXUHGLV:KDW0DWWHUV7DUJHWVDQG*DPLQJLQWKH(QJOLVK3XEOLF+HDOWK&DUH
System, Public Administration 84:3 (2006), pp. 520-1. 
21
 Patrick Dunleavy, Helen Margetts, Simon Bastow, and Jane 7LQNOHUµ1HZ3XEOLF0DQDJHPHQWLV
Dead - Long Live Digital-(UD*RYHUQDQFH¶ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 
16:3 (2006), pp. 467-494; Chris LorenzµIf You're So Smart, Why Are You Under Surveillance? 
Universities, Neoliberalism, and New Public Management¶ Critical Inquiry 38:3 (2012), pp. 599-629. 
22
 )RUDQRYHUYLHZRIWKLVWUDQVIRUPDWLRQVHH-RKQ7R\Hµ&KDQJLQJ3HUVSHFWLYHVLQ'HYHORSPHQW
(FRQRPLFV¶LQ+D-Joon Chang (ed) Rethinking Development Economics (London: Anthem, 2003), 
pp.21-40. ,QDVLPLODUYHLQ-DFTXHOLQH%HVW¶VUHFHQWZRUNRQWUDQVIRUPDWLRQVLQGHYHORSPHQWSUDFWLFH
suggests that the increased preoccupation with managing risk and benchmarking performance has been 
driven by a growing preoccupation with policy failure through the 1990s. See Jacqueline Best, 
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framework content or application, they will nonetheless receive material or normative 
sanctions in the case of under-performance. In order for this mode to be achieved through 
benchmarking interventions that bring together more equal partners, it is necessary for all 
SDUWLHVWRFRQWLQXHWRµEX\LQ¶WRWKHIUDPHZRrk through its execution. Where direct lines of 
responsibility are layered in to the framework at the moment of design and maintained 
through the process of execution, the benchmarking intervention overall can be characterised 
DVRQHRIµGLUHFWUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ 
From the same starting point of direct responsibility by design, an alternative mode 
can be reached through more dynamic patterns of interaction between the agents brought 
together by a benchmarking intervention. Where evaluations flag up poor performance, blame 
games can kick in to play as benchmarkees work to evade material sanctions and preserve 
reputation. While sanctions and reputational loss can be hard to avoid,23 the invocation of 
mitigating factors can be used to minimise these costs by laying responsibility for sub-optimal 
outcomes with exogenous events. 24  In addition, third-party actors can be used by the 
benchmarkee in blame avoidance techniques. In the realm of development, the International 
Monetary Fund in particular is often singled out as being responsible for perceived 
performance failures in national economies operating under its loan arrangements.25 Where 
direct lines of responsibility are layered in at the moment of design and successfully 
challenged through the process of execution, the benchmarking intervention overall can be 
FKDUDFWHULVHGDVRQHRIµVWUDWHJLFEOXUULQJ¶ 
   Turning now to the modes in which the starting point for the benchmarking 
intervention was one of diffuse lines of responsibility, the relationships surrounding the 
Millennium Development Goals as explored below provide useful exemplars. Diffuse lines of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Governing Failure: Provisional Expertise and the Transformation of Development Finance 
(Cambridge: University Press, 2014). 
23
 3DWWHUQVRIVWDELOLW\DQGFKDQJHLQDFWRUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVLQWKLVUHJDUGDUHHxplored in Thomas Preston, 
µ:HDWKHULQJWKH3ROLWLFVRI5HVSRQVLELOLW\DQG%ODPH¶LQ$UMHQ%RLQ$OODQ0F&RQQHOODQGPaul Hart 
(eds) Governing after Crisis: The Politics of Investigation, Accountability and Learning (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 33-61. 
24
 0F*UDZµ$YRLGLQJ%ODPH¶ 
25
 For detailed exploration of scapegoating and the IMF, see James Vreeland, The IMF and Economic 
Development (Cambridge: University Press, 2003). 
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responsibility may be layered in to a benchmarking intervention where the architects are 
located on the margins of a given policy area and so are unable to control the flow of 
normative and material sanctions, or where there is a low level of consensus over the identity 
of the actors with the predominant capability to shape the benchmarked outcome. In the case 
of the MDGs, a combination of these two factors shaped the incorporation of diffuse lines of 
responsibility in to the benchmarking system. In addition to fearing that the creation of direct 
responsibilities on state actors might reduce their willingness to sign-up to the scheme, the 
MDG architects were working in a context in which beliefs over the actors and factors 
influencing development outcomes remain heavily contested. 26  As such, the location of 
responsibility for the achievement of MDG-related indicators remained under-specified. 
Outcomes in the realms of education, health, sanitation, and the environment were diffused 
DFURVVWKHµLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶,QWKHUHDOPRIRYHUVHDVGHYHORSPHQWDLGWKHRQHDUHD
where a relatively precise group of relevant actors can be seen to exist, responsibility was 
diffused through the creation of an imprecisely specified target.27    
From this starting point, DQRYHUDOOPRGHRIµGLIIXVH UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ZLOOEHDFKLHYHG
if there is an overall pattern of stability in the relationship between actors brought together by 
the intervention. Through the lifetime of the MDGs, prominent dynamics served to create 
such institutional inertia. As is analysed below, by largely eschewing MDG targets and 
indicators within their national development strategies, developing country governments were 
able to avoid establishing a more direct line of responsibility for these benchmarked 
outcomes. However, additional interactions that occurred within and around the UN review 
                                                     
26
 See, for example, Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (eds) International Development and the 
Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2008). 
27
 ,QWHUHVWLQJO\LWVHHPVWKDWRWKHUDWWHPSWVWREHQFKPDUNWKHµELJSLFWXUH¶RIGHYHORSPHQW
achievements have sought to embed more precisely delineated lines of responsibility than occurred 
with the MDGs. The 2005 Paris Declaration and its later Accra and Busan manifestations, for example, 
consciously aimed to adopt this more precise mode. In contrast to the MDGs, where the reluctance of 
the IUDPHZRUN¶VFORVHGWHDPRIDUFKLWHFWVWRVFDUHVWDWHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDZD\IURPWKHEHQFKPDUNLQJ
system led them to avoid imposing clear lines of responsibility, the Paris and later declarations were 
the product of more open drafting processes with more direct state representative involvement. See 
Bernard Wood, Dorte Kabell, Nansozi Muwanga, and Francisco Sagasti, Evaluation of the 
Implementation of the Paris Declaration (Paris: OECD, 2005). Thanks to the Review of International 
Studies anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to these points of comparison. 
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summits served to generate a momentum that, in fact, was followed by an overall pattern of 
µVWUDWHJLFFODULILFDWLRQ¶DVWKH0'*VZHUHVXSHUVHGHGE\WKH6XVWDLQDEOH'HYHORSPHQW*RDOV 
Strategic clarification in benchmarking systems can be driven by both pull- and push-
related factors. With the former, the emergent benchmarkee works to clarify their line of 
responsibility to the benchmarked indicator; with the latter, third-party actors work to identify 
the benchmarkee to whom a clarified line of responsibility is to be attached. AFWRUV¶GHVLUHWR
secure reputational enhancement constitutes a significant pull-related factor. Where a 
benchmarked indicator begins to signal signs of success, actors may attempt to take 
ownership of positive performance.28 $FWRUV¶GHVLUHWRFRPSHORWKHUVLQWREHKDYLRXUDOFKDQJH
constitutes a significant push-related factor. By establishing a clearer relationship between an 
actor and a benchmarked indicator that is signalling a sign of failure, normative and material 
sanctions can be deployed to catalyse change in the emergent benchmarkee.29  
With the MDGs, it is through these push-related dynamics that strategic clarification 
has over time become layered in to the framework. In particular, throughout the MDG review 
summits that have been analysed, consistent calls were voiced for clearer lines of 
responsibility to be drawn to two additional components of the benchmarking system. On the 
one hand, a significant proportion of developing country representatives made calls to layer-
in a more precise overseas development assistance target into the framework, to be met by 
their developed country counterparts; on the other, many developed country representatives 
made calls to layer-in more precise targets in relation to domestic institutional reform and 
anti-corruption measures, with responsibility tied to their developing country counterparts. 
                                                     
28
 &KULVWRSKHU+RRGµ3XEOLF6HUYLFH0DQDJHULDOLVP2QZDUGVDQG8SZDUGVRU³7UREULDQG&ULFNHW´
$JDLQ"¶The Political Quarterly 72:3 (2001), pp.300-309. Similar dynamics are explored in Ben Clift 
DQG-LP7RPOLQVRQµWhatever Happened to the Balance of Payments ³3roblem´? The Contingent 
(Re)construction of British Economic Performance Assessment, British Journal of Politics & 
International Relations 10:4 (2008), pp. 607-629. 
29
 Several studies have explored the way in which the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
'HYHORSPHQW¶V3URJUDPPHIRU,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WXGHQW$VVHVVPHQWKDVEHHQLQYRNHGLQWKLVPDQQHU6HH
Ruth Dixon, Christiane Arndt, Manuel Mullers, Jarmo Vakkuri, Kristina Engblom-Pelkkala, and 
&KULVWRSKHU+RRGµ$/HYHU)RU,PSURYHPHQW2U$0DJQHW)RU%ODPH"3UHVVDQG3ROLWLFDO5HVSRQVHV
WR,QWHUQDWLRQDO(GXFDWLRQDO5DQNLQJVLQ)RXU(8&RXQWULHV¶Public Administration 91:2 (2013), 
pp.484-505; -RKDQQD5LQJDUSDQG0DUWLQ5RWKODQGµ,VWKH*UDVV$OZD\V*UHHQHU"7KH(IIHFWRIWKH
3,6$5HVXOWVRQ(GXFDWLRQ'HEDWHVLQ6ZHGHQDQG*HUPDQ\¶European Educational Research 
Journal 9:3 (2010), pp. 422-430. For more general reflections on this form of blame shifting, see 
Christopher Hood, The Blame Game, 67-89. 
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While these elements remained excluded from the content of the MDG framework, they have 
become incorporated into the expanded set of Sustainable Development Goals that have 
recently superseded the 2001-15 initiative. By adopting an extended view that considers the 
MDG framework and its transition into the SDGs, and noting that the push towards the 
creation of more direct lines of responsibility emerged in the examined UN review summits, 
through this paper I suggest that the MDG benchmarking intervention can be characterised as 
following the mode of strategic clarification.  
The empirical material contained in this paper comes from an analysis of the archival 
records connected to UN summitry on the Millennium Development Goals, and of a series of 
national development plans. The archival records drawn upon come from the repository of 
speeches delivered at two major Millennium Development Goal progress reviews, held at the 
United Nations headquarters in September 2008 and September 2013. In total, 86 
contributions were analysed.30 In addition to evaluating the level of support displayed for the 
benchmarking system overall and its component parts, I have also recorded whether clear 
calls for re-focusing or extending the initiative were delivered. Where such a call was issued, 
the primary reform being advocated was recorded.31 The national development plans analysed 
consisted of a randomly selected sample of one-third of the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers published by low-income countries by the close of 2013. 32  Given that UN 
documentation surrounding the launch of the MDG framework suggested that PRSPs be used 
by developing countries to outline their pathways towards PHHWLQJ WKH IUDPHZRUN¶V WDUJHWV
and indicators, this represents an appropriate location at which to further probe the presence 
                                                     
30
 75 of these were delivered by state representatives, eight from representatives of non-governmental 
organisations, and three from representatives of inter-governmental organisations. 
31
 Single counting was used in order to enhance the comparability of the data collected; had multiple 
counting been used to track each of the suggested areas of reform, noise from representatives with 
wide-ranging agendas would have effectively drowned out the more focused contributions. For 
discussion of the operationalization of quantitative coding techniques, see Carl Auerbach and Louise 
Silverstein, Qualitative Data: An Introduction to Coding and Analysis (New York: New York 
University Press, 2003). 
32
 The selected countries used in this study (and the year in which the PRSP was published) are: 
Bangladesh (2012), Burundi (2006), Cambodia (2005), Ethiopia (2005), Kenya (2004), Liberia (2008), 
Madagascar (2007), Malawi (2012), Rwanda (2007), Sierra Leone (2005), Tajikistan (2009), and 
Uganda (2010). 
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or absence of strategic clarification through the lifetime of the benchmarking initiative.33 The 
finding that the extent of engagement with MDG indicators within PRSPs remains limited 
serves to confirm and extend the conclusions offered by Fukuda-3DUU¶VHYDOXDWLRQ.34 Overall, 
by demonstrating that sustained contestation within review summits has been followed by 
strategic clarification through the SDGs, new light is shed on the intersection between blame 
games and this most prominent of benchmarking initiatives. 
The empirical analysis presented in the sections below provide an overview of the 
blame games involving state representatives in the world of the Millennium Development 
Goals. The terrain of blame games and the MDGs stretches out beyond these parameters, to 
other actors and to other levels of governance. In domestic political constellations across 
many developing countries, local and national actors have attempted to tie blame to governing 
authorities for perceived underperformance in relation to particular Goals. Indeed, it has been 
VXJJHVWHGE\%HUJKHW DO WKDW µD ODUJHSDUW RI WKH MDG success story seems to be the role 
played by domestic politics¶,35 with progress having been catalysed when non-governmental 
organisations and others have helped generate such strategic clarification. While 
acknowledging the importance of these additional sites of contestation and recognising the 
need for further study of the intersection of blame games and benchmarking through these 
networks, through the sections below I review the dynamics as manifest in the key UN review 
summits and the surrounding PRSP policy documentation.   
 
The MDGs and Diffuse Responsibility By Design 
Authorship processes matter in the world of global governance. Strategically important actors 
can go to extraordinary lengths to ensure that documentation providing an institutionally-
                                                     
33
 Indeed, PRSPs were used by Fukuda-Parr when assessing the extent to which the MDGs had been 
disseminated across developing country governments. See Fukuda-3DUUµ$UHWKH0'*VD3ULRULW\"¶In 
order to gauge the extent to which (aspects of) the MDG framework have been incorporated into the 
overarching developmental vision these PRSPs, I have concentrated analysis on the Executive 
Summary or equivalent section. These sections typically run to between 15 and 20 pages in length. 
34
 Fukuda-3DUUµ$UHWKH0'*VD3ULRULW\"¶ The extension relates to the chronological coverage and 
individual cases reviewed. 
35
 Gina Bergh, Marta Foresti, Alina Rocha Menocal, and Leni Wild, Building Governance into a Post-
2015 Framework: Exploring Transparency and Accountability as an Entry Point (London: Overseas 
Development Institute, 2012). 
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endorsed perspective coheres with their own preferences and ideas.36 Here, I explore the 
impact of the writing process behind the formation of the Millennium Development Goals on 
the designation of responsibility for the performance indicators within the framework. The 
drafting of the MDGs was a highly atypical production process at the United Nations. UN 
reports are often the product of extended drafting processes, through which a wide range of 
interested parties are provided with an opportunity to review and suggest amendments to a 
given text. This writing by committee can lead to the production of balanced documents 
ZKRVH FRQWHQWV DUH ZLGHO\ DSSURYHG EXW ZKLFK ODFN D FOHDU µWDNH KRPH PHVVDJH¶37  In 
contrast, the tightly-controlled process surrounding the MDG initiative saw direct input 
limited to a small circle. In crafting a framework capable of generating rapid endorsement 
from across the whole body of UN membership, the content laid down by the MDG authors 
was designed to exclude clear lines of responsibility for the achievement of particular 
development-related outcomes. By design, the MDG framework was a benchmarking 
intervention with diffuse lines of responsibility. 
It was on 18th September 2000 that the 189 member states of the United Nations 
adopted the Millennium Declaration. The Declaration was the core outcome of the 
Millennium Summit earlier that month, at which the largest gathering of world leaders in 
history had articulated their collective commitment to the values and principles of the United 
1DWLRQV7KH6XPPLWKDGEHHQFDOOHGE\WKH*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\WRµSURYLGHDQRSSRUWXQLW\WR
strengthen the role of the UN in meeting the challenges of the twenty-ILUVW FHQWXU\¶.38 In 
keeping with the unprecedented scale and extremely high profile of the event, the text of the 
Declaration established an ambitious vision. 39  The agenda that was laid out was broad 
ranging, detailing hopes for progress in issue areas including reform of the UN, peace and 
                                                     
36
 Robert Hunter Wade, µ86+HJHPRQ\DQGWKH:RUOG%DQN7KH%DWWOH2YHU3HRSOHDQG,GHDV¶
Review of International Political Economy, 9:2 (2002), pp. 215-43. 
37
 The information about drafting processes was provided by a former member of staff from the UN 
Habitat programme, in a May 2012 interview with the author. A similar account is provided by 
Fukuda-3DUUDQG+XOPHµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO1RUP'\QDPLFV¶ 
38
 UN, Millennium Declaration (New York: UN, 2000). 
39
 For a comprehensive review of contributions to the Millennium Summit, see Jerome Glenn, 
Elizabeth Florescu, and Theodore Gordon, Analysis of United Nations Millennium Summit Speeches 
(Georgia: Army Environment Policy Institute, 2001). 
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security, and poverty reduction. It was around 18 months after the adoption of the Declaration 
that the Millennium Development Goals were unveiled as the vehicle through which these 
development commitments would be operationalised.  
 To understand the emergence of the Millennium Development Goal framework, it is 
necessary to switch venues from the United Nations to the OECD. 40  The OECD was 
HVWDEOLVKHGLQDQGWKURXJKRXWWKH&ROG:DUIXQFWLRQHGDVVRPHWKLQJDVDµWKLQNWDQNRI
the :HVW¶7KURXJKRXWWKHVIROORZLQJWKHFORVHRIWKHLGHRORJLFDOVWDQGRIIEHWZHHQWKH
US and USSR, the OECD¶V leadership sought to enhance the policy relevance of its work 
programmes as a means of securing the LQVWLWXWLRQ¶VIXWXUHUROH.41 It is in this context that the 
OECD extension of its engagement with issues surrounding aid and development occurred. 
As part of its efforts to improve the effectiveness of bilateral assistance and the level of 
harmonisation amongst donor states, the OECD had in the late 1990s established a series of 
International Development Goals on which to focus their efforts. In 1999 the profile of the 
International Development Goal benchmarking system was significantly increased when the 
OECD joined with the European Commission, IMF, UN, and World Bank to conduct a 
progress review. In June 2000, as final preparations for the Millennium Summit were 
underway, the collaborative report on A Better World For All was published. The structure 
and content of the International Development Goals would, in due course, would come to 
form the basis of the MDGs. 
 The transfer of these ideas from the OECD-led initiative into the MDGs was 
facilitated by the contracting-in of actors involved with the former into the process 
surrounding the drafting of the latter. Once the initial green light had been provided by 
through the Millennium Summit, the task of transforming a somewhat amorphous Declaration 
into an actionable benchmarking system was taken up by a handful of individuals in UNDP 
and the United NDWLRQV6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO¶V2IILFH (UNSGO). Under the leadership of Mark 
                                                     
40
 7KHIROORZLQJQDUUDWLYHDFFRXQWGUDZVWRJHWKHULQVLJKWVSXWIRUZDUGLQ+XOPHDQG6FRWWµ3ROLWLFDO
(FRQRP\RIWKH0'*V¶)XNXGD-3DUUDQG+XOPHµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO1RUP'\QDPLFV¶DQG+XFN-Ju Kwon 
and Eunju Kim, µ3RYHUW\5HGXFWLRQDQG*RRG*RYHUQDQFH([DPLQLQJWKH5DWLRQDOHRIWKH
0LOOHQQLXP'HYHORSPHQW*RDOV¶Development and Change, ifirst (2014), pp. 1-23. 
41
 9RQ%RJGDQG\DQG*ROGPDQQµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO3XEOLF$XWKRULW\¶-8. 
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Malloch-Brown of UNDP and Michael Doyle of UNSGO, staff from across the OECD, UN, 
and World Bank were brought together to form a small MDG committee. All members of the 
committee had been involved in the A Better World For All publication, and the preliminary 
version of the Millennium Development Goals was framed around the same seven pillars that 
had provided structure to the earlier iteration. Through the process an eighth goal, relating to 
the formation of a global partnership to foster development, was layered in to the 
benchmarking system. 
The Millennium Development Goals were presented to the UN General Assembly in 
December 2001, where the benchmarking system was µQRWHG¶ ZLWKRut objection from the 
floor.42 The MDG system is made up of three interlinked levels. At the broadest level are the 
goals. Each goal has between one and six targets, which in turn are monitored by between one 
and four indicators. In total, the MDG framework includes eight goals, 21 targets, and 60 
indicators. The eight goals at the heart of the framework outline a commitment to: eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality; 
reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases; 
ensure environmental sustainability, and; establish a global partnership for development. 
 In line with their differing professional affiliations, the team involved in drafting the 
Millennium Development Goal framework had consciously aimed to create a benchmark 
around which a wide range of agencies could coordinate their activities. Drawing-in major 
international organisations and leaders of developed and developing countries alike, the 
MDGs were designHGDVD WRRO WR µH[SUHVV WKH UHVROYHRI WKHZRUOG¶VSROLWLFDO OHDGHUV WR«
PDNHWKHULJKWWRGHYHORSPHQWDUHDOLW\IRUHYHU\RQH¶43 In order to minimise the possibility of 
any constituent group wishing to dissociate themselves from the framework or stall its 
progress through the UN General Assembly, the drafting team structured the framework in 
such a manner as to avoid directly apportioning responsibility for the achievement of 
individual elements on particular actors. Goals One to Seven were linked to precisely defined 
                                                     
42
 Such noting represents a lower-RUGHUIRUPRIDFFHSWDQFHWKDQµDSSURYDO¶ZKLFKUHTXLUHVDSRVLWLYH
vote. Fukuda-3DUUDQG+XOPHµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO1RUP'\QDPLFV¶ 
43
 UN, Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration (New York: UN, 2002), p. 8. 
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targets and indicators, but responsibility for the ultimate achievement of these outcomes was 
placed rather diffusely at the door of all members of the international system. Goal Eight 
specifically aimed to encourage developed countries to adjust their aid, trade, and other 
externally-oriented policies so as to foster a more development-enhancing environment; 
however, unlike the earlier elements of the framework, no quantitative metrics were tied to 
this aspect. The MDG authors were particularly wary of including the 0.7 percent of GDP aid 
target, for fear of alienating in particular the US and Japanese leadership from the initiative.44 
Driven by this imminent conflict-avoiding dynamic, responsibility for the 
achievements of the development outcomes being monitored by the Millennium Development 
Goal framework was diffused across a wide range of actors. With no direct mechanisms in 
place to hook material resources or normative suasion to the achievement of the Goals, the 
framework lacked the necessary foundations through which to compel good performance 
through the exercise of precisely targeted sanctions.45 As is outlined below, this lack of focus 
on the discrete responsibilities of identified agents would come to be criticized through 
subsequent reviews of the Millennium Development Goal framework. It is to the evaluation 
of these dynamics that I now turn. Initially, disengagement from the MDGs within national 
development strategies served to reproduce the diffuse lines of responsibility that had been 
embedded at the design phase. Through the 2008 and 2013 review summits the foundations of 
strategic clarification began to be laid; foundations that, in due course, would come to be 
incorporated into the successor Sustainable Development Goals framework.  
 
The MDGs and the Emergence of Strategic Clarification 
The context into which the Millennium Development Goal initiative was born did not augur 
well for the success of the benchmarking intervention. The immediate aftermath of the launch 
of the MDG framework was a turbulent time across the UN system, with the schism created 
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 Fukuda-3DUUDQG+XOPHµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO1RUP'\QDPLFV¶ 
45
 The situation is succinctly summarised by John McArthur, who in a recent evaluation noted that 
µ>W@KH0'*VZHUHQRWERUQZLWKDSODQ DEXGJHWRUDVSHFLILFPDSSLQJRXWRIUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV«1R
VLQJOHLQGLYLGXDORURUJDQL]DWLRQLVUHVSRQVLEOHIRUDFKLHYLQJWKH0'*V¶0F$UWKXUµ2ZQWKH*RDOV¶
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E\ WKH  ,UDT LQYDVLRQ DQG VXEVHTXHQW LQYHVWLJDWLRQ LQWR FRUUXSWLRQ ZLWKLQ WKH µRLO IRU
IRRG¶ SURJUDPPH FUHDWLQJ VLJQLILFDQW UHputational damage.46 The legitimacy of the MDG 
framework itself was also initially challenged by actors dissatisfied with the closed nature of 
the drafting process through which the initiative was created,47 although over time the Goals 
did come to attract a high degree of support from across the international development 
policymaking community. As is detailed below, initially the lines of responsibility 
surrounding the framework remained diffuse, with developing country governments by and 
large eschewing MDG targets and indicators from their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. 
However, through the MDG review summits of 2008 and 2013, the beginnings of a push 
toward strategic clarification began to emerge. Through the successor Sustainable 
Development Goals, this process of strategic clarification has been consolidated. 
Within the 12 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers that were reviewed, all contained a 
broad commitment to the framework. These national development plans are variously 
SUHVHQWHG DV DLPLQJ WRZDUGV µIUHHLQJ RXU SHRSOH IURP SRYHUW\ DQG achieving the targeted 
0'*V¶,48 DFKLHYLQJ µSRYHUW\ UHGXFWLRQ OLQNHG WR WKH 0'*V¶,49 and creating the structural 
IRXQGDWLRQV ZKRVH HVWDEOLVKPHQW µDUH GLUHFWO\ OLQNHG WR WKH DFKLHYHPHQW RI WKH 0'*V¶50 
However, the extensity with which the MDG framework was used to frame national 
development plans varied significantly. At one end of the scale, in their development plan the 
Cambodian government consciously and directly mirrored the MDG framework. Indeed, 
focusing as it did on achieving the Cambodian Millennium Development Goals, the ends of 
development included in this Paper borrowed their title and core content from the UN 
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 These issues are identified by Mark Malloch-Brown, who led the UNDP throughout this period, as 
having played a major role in holding back the progress of the MDG initiative. Mark Malloch-Brown, 
The Unfinished Global Revolution: The Limits of Nations and the Pursuit of a New Politics (London: 
Allen Lane, 2011), pp.162-70.  
47
 5REHUWR%LVVLRµ&LYLOVRFLHW\DQGWKH0'*V¶Development Policy Journal 3:1 (2003), pp. 151-160. 
48
 Government of the 3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI%DQJODGHVK, National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty 
Reduction (Dhaka: National Planning Commission, 2012), p. i. 
49
 Government of the Republic of Kenya, Investment Programme for the Economic Recovery Strategy 
and Employment Creation (Nairobi: Government of the Republic of Kenya, 2004), p.1. 
50
 Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, Poverty Reduction Strategy (Dushanbe: Government of 
the Republic of Tajikistan, 2009), p.30. 
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framework.51 At the other end, in several development plans the MDG framework remaining 
a marginal feature, attracting just one or two brief mentions.  
 Further insights into the lines of responsibility between developing country 
governments and MDGs can be gained by exploring the detail of the engagement with 
individual targets and indicators in PRSPs. In keeping with the prominence of its discursive 
commitment, the Cambodian government leads the field in outlining a commitment to address 
27 of the individual indicators from the MDG framework.52 These indicators are drawn from 
across the spectrum of the MDGs, with aspects of Goals One to Seven all represented. Other 
instances of a relatively high level of correspondence between the content of the MDG 
benchmarking system and individual national plans come with the Tajik and Bangladeshi 
PRSPs, through which 14 and 13 indicators have been incorporated respectively. At the other 
end of the scale, while the Liberian PRSP did contain a discursive commitment to 
µSURJUHVVLQJ WRZDUG WKH 0LOOHQQLXP 'HYHORSPHQW *RDOV¶,53 no individual MDG indicators 
were included in the core focus of the Paper. The core focus of the Burundian, Kenyan, and 
Ugandan Papers included just one of the MDG indicators, coming in the form of the measures 
of the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, primary school enrolment, and the proportion of the 
population living on US$1 per day respectively.  
Beneath this pattern of individual variation, common features of the PRSPs can be 
discerned that highlight where MDG indicators have ± and have not ± been integrated into 
national conceptualisations of the appropriate ends of development. The US$1 per day 
poverty benchmark was already a prominent feature of the development landscape by the 
launch of the MDG framework,54 and as such it is perhaps unsurprising that this element was 
the most widely drawn upon within Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (see Figure 2). Three-
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 Royal Government of Cambodia, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Phnom Penh: Royal 
Government of Cambodia, 2006). 
52
 In total, 44 indicators are associated with Goals One to Seven of the MDGs, which are the aspects of 
the framework that relate to developing country outcomes. As such, even the best-performing PRSPs 
display only a modest level of engagement in absolute terms.  
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 Government of the Republic of Liberia, Poverty Reduction Strategy (Monrovia: Government of the 
Republic of Liberia, 2008), p.13. 
54
 .ZRQDQG.LPµ3RYHUW\5HGXFWLRQDQG*RRG*RYHUQDQFH¶-3. 
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quarters of the Papers included this indicator as a core end to be achieved in national 
development programmes. Beyond this central marker for the first Millennium Development 
Goal, key measures from Goal Two regarding primary school completion, Goal Six regarding 
HIV prevalence, and Goal Seven regarding access to improved water and sanitation were 
present in the core aims of two-thirds of the Papers.  
 
Figure 2: Most commonly appearing MDG indicators in PRSPs 
 
SoXUFH$XWKRU¶VDQDO\VLVRIPRSP content. 
 
The establishment of clear lines of responsibility between developing country 
government and MDG indicator was, however, the exception rather than rule in the examined 
PRSPs. Beyond the 5 mentioned in Figure 1, none of the other 60 indicators from the MDG 
benchmarking system appeared in over half of the papers examined. In total, one quarter of 
the 60 failed to make it into any of the core aims of these PRSPs. Goal Five, which focuses on 
maternal health, remained the most overlooked. 55  Amongst the component indicators, 
measures relating to adolescent motherhood and unmet family planning requirements 
remained entirely absent, while indicators on births attended by a professional, the prevalence 
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of contraceptive use, and antenatal visits appeared only in the Cambodian Paper. Goal Seven, 
which focuses on environmental sustainability, remained the second most overlooked. 56 
Indicators relating to the proportion of land mass covered by forest and the proportion of 
terrestrial and marine areas under official protection featured in just two Papers each. In 
addition, six indicators associated with Goal Seven remained entirely absent. Included 
amongst these were the measures of CO2 emissions, consumption of ozone-depleting 
materials, and total water use.  
Given that one-quarter of MDG indicators failed to feature at all in the reviewed 
PRSPs, and that the average prevalence rate was just 16 percent,57 it can be seen that by and 
large developing country governments remained disengaged from the benchmarking system 
through these documents. In the main, direct lines of responsibility between governments and 
Goals failed to emerge within PRSPs. Through the UN review summits of the MDGs, the 
dominant pattern of engagement from participants was to display a combination of effusive 
support for the framework in general terms, while raising points of contestation in relation to 
particular points of detail. It is through the latter that evidence of a push toward strategic 
clarification of the benchmarking system can begin to be seen, with developed and 
developing country representatives working to lay blame for under-performance at each 
RWKHU¶VGRRU  
At both the 2008 and 2013 events, virtually all participants presented strong praise for 
the MDG framework in their delivered statements. Examples include the following: 
$W WKHGDZQRI WKHQHZPLOOHQQLXP«WKH0LOOHQQLXP 'HFODUDWLRQZDVVLJQHG WKDW
provides a EROG YLVLRQ WKDW« SURYLGHV D FUXFLDO SRLQW RI UHIHUHQFH IRU PHDVXULQJ
progress towards the establishment of a new world order that would be more 
equitable.58 
 
                                                     
56
 Goal Seven had a prevalence rate of 15 percent: from a potential 120 appearances, the ten associated 
indicators were mentioned on just 18 occasions. 
57
 Goals One to Seven, which are the aspects of the MDG framework that relate to developing country 
outcomes, contain 44 associated targets and indicators. Across the 12 examined PRSPs, a 100 percent 
prevalence rate would have required a total count of 528; the actual count of 86 equates to a prevalence 
rate of 16 percent. 
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 Hamad Al-Thani, µ6WDWHPHQWIURPWKH6WDWHRI4DWDUDWWKH+LJK-Level Event of the United Nations 
RQWKH0LOOHQQLXP'HYHORSPHQW*RDOV¶UN General Assembly Hall 25th September (2008), p. 2. 
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The Millennium Development Goals were not a mere declaration. They are 
expressions of our common humanity, our common vision for a better world.59 
 
$WWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHQHZPLOOHQQLXPRXUOHDGHUVFDPHWRJHWKHU«WRH[SUHVVRXU
shared commitment to reduce poverty and promote a more secure and prosperous 
world. The Millennium Development Goals express these shared commitments.60 
 
However, underlying this superficial acceptance of the MDG framework as constituting a 
compelling vision for international development in the Twenty-First Century, significant 
discontent was displayed regarding the detail of the benchmarking system.   
In total, around 85 percent of the representations delivered at the UN review summits 
contained clear injunctions to extend the MDG framework.61 Underlying these calls was a 
shared assumption that a higher degree of specificity was required in relation to the lines of 
responsibility surrounding the achievement of the benchmarked MDG outcomes. 
Overwhelmingly, developed country representatives shifted blame toward the high levels of 
corruption and poor institutional performance in developing countries, while developing 
country governments shifted blame toward the unwillingness of developed country 
counterparts to live up to aid commitments.  
The most commonly raised area for enhanced attention within the MDG framework 
related to the responsibility of developed country representatives to deliver appropriate 
volumes of aid flows. Discussions of Official Development Assistance (ODA) have an 
established lineage in UN forums; it was within the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development that, in the late 1960s, the much-cited 0.7 percent of GDP first emerged and 
gained traction.62 The exclusion of this target from the MDG benchmarking system generated 
notable discontent. In total, this was the primary criticism offered by around one-third of 
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 Haim Divon, µ6WDWHPHQWIURPWKH6WDWHRI,VUDHODWWKH+LJK-Level Event of the United Nations on 
WKH0LOOHQQLXP'HYHORSPHQW*RDOV¶UN General Assembly Hall 25th September (2008), p. 1. 
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 Julie Bishop, µ6WDWHPHQWIURPWKH6WDWHRI$XVWUDOLDDWWKH6SHFLDO(YHQWRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV
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 Of the 87 statements reviewed, 13 did not include a clear call for the MDG framework to be 
extended or re-focused.  
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 For a detailed history of this target, see Michael Clemens and Todd Moss, µ*KRVWRI2ULJLQV
DQG5HOHYDQFHRIWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO$LG7DUJHW¶International Journal of Development Issues 6;1 
(2007), pp. 3-25. The evolution of the target within the UN can be traced back to the beginning of the 
first Decade of Development, and the General Assembly resolutions 1522 and 1711 of 1960 and 1961 
respectively. These resolutions initially set the target at 1 percent. Thanks to the Review of 
International Studies anonymous reviewer for directing my attention to these roots. 
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participants at the 2008 and 2013 events. Through these contributions, inadequate levels of 
funding were highlighted as the core impediment to the more effective achievement of the 
ends of development as outlined in the MDG framework. The following calls are broadly 
representative: 
All studies on the attainment of the MDGs have identified lack of finances as the 
PDLQLPSHUDWLYH«7KHLPSHUDWLYHWRUHDFKWKHJRDORISHUFHQWRI*URVV1DWLRQDO
Income on an urgent basis cannot be overstated.63 
 
,QDGHTXDWHILQDQFLQJ« limits our capacity to implement MDG initiatives.64 
 
[Poverty reduction] will remain elusive if the cooperating partners do not play their 
part and fulfil their role. It is sad to note that net official development assistance 
dropped by 4.7 percent in 2006 and a further 8.4 percent in 2007. Only five countries 
met or exceeded the 0.7 percent target.65 
 
Amongst advocates of this extension, failures to reach the 0.7 percent figure were commonly 
alluded to, and the fact that this target remained absent from the plethora of indicators within 
the benchmarking system attracted critical comment.66 No OECD members were amongst the 
supporters of the extensioQRIWKH0'*IUDPHZRUN¶VIRFXVRQWKLVLVVXH67  
Where OECD country representatives at the UN review summits did advocate 
extension of the benchmarking system, their focus was firmly directed towards foregrounding 
the responsibilities of developing country governments in fostering effective progress. 
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Attention on the role of domestic institutions in fostering development was relatively well-
established by the time of the launch of the MDGs, most notably at the World Bank.68 At the 
UN events, strong advocacy for enhancing the focus on domestic institutional reform came 
from many representatives of developed country governments. Around half of the OECD 
representatives highlighted this issue as the key intervening variable in shaping successful 
outcomes. Comments from the US, Poland, and Sweden respectively capture the flavour of 
these injunctions:   
*RYHUQDQFH LV WKH IDFWRU WKDW EHVW H[SODLQV WKH SHUIRUPDQFH RI $IULFDQ FRXQWULHV«
The fight against corruption and entrenched interests remains a challenge in many 
places.69 
 
It is of utmost importance that the community of recipients live up to the rules of 
good governance, and assumes responsibility for the initiatives designed to achieve 
the MDGs.70 
 
We need democratic, effective, and accountable public institutions. We cannot fight 
SRYHUW\ZLWKRXWILJKWLQJFRUUXSWLRQ«&RUUXSWLRQXQGHUPLQHVJURZWKDQGSURVSHULW\
DQG DQ HIIHFWLYH VWDWH DQG VWDEOH VRFLHW\ :H« KDYH D UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR ILJKW
corruption, and we should make a special effort in the coming 800 days [leading to 
the MDG census point].71 
 
From amongst the non-OECD members, the Rwandan representative was the sole 
representative to strongly endorse the call for a greater focus on domestic governance 
reform.72  
 As the MDGs drew towards their 2015 final census point, discussions over the form 
to be taken by their replacement became increasingly focused. It is through the creation of 
these Sustainable Development Goals that the process of strategic clarification, evident in the 
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UN review summits outlined above, was consolidated. In a marked contrast to the MDGs, the 
authorship process leading up to the launch of the SDGs has involved consultations with a 
wide range of state and non-state actors. As attempts to shape the SDGs reached their peak 
through a series of thematic workshops in late 2013 and early 2014, it was in fact suggested 
WKDW µDZKROH LQGXVWU\ LVQRZ LQJHDU WRFRQVWUXFW WKHJOREDOJRDOV¶73 Led by a 30-member 
Open Working Group, 74  13 sessions were held between March 2013 and July 2014 to 
populate a 17-Goal template that had been generated through the earlier Rio+20 UN 
Conference on Sustainable Development. The outcome from this process, which was released 
in July 2014, lists over 160 targets and indicators to be met by census points in 2020 and 
2030.75 Through the inclusion of more precisely specified obligations, the SDG framework is 
serving to enact a strategic clarification of the lines of responsibility surrounding the UN-
centred global development benchmark (Figure 1).  
The disputes that were evident in the MDG review processes between developed and 
developing states over the lines of responsibility surrounding global poverty reduction have 
carried over into the Open Working Group discussions of SDG content. In the Open Working 
*URXS GLVFXVVLRQV WKDW VRXJKW WR FODULI\ DQG TXDQWLI\ WKH µJOREDO SDUWQHUVKLS¶ QHHGHG WR
support development progress, while many of the contributions from developing countries 
pressed for the inclusion of the 0.7 percent target, no support was forthcoming from 
developed country representatives.76 In a similar vein, through the discussions of the role of 
                                                     
73
 5REHUW:DGHµ&XUUHQW7KLQNLQJ$ERXW*OREDO7UDGH3ROLF\¶International Development at 
the LSE Blog, available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/internationaldevelopment/2013/12/19/current-thinking-
about-global-trade-policy/. Accessed 21st April, 2014. 
74
 States were arranged into constituency groupings of between one and four members, with each 
grouping selecting a representative. For details of these groupings see UN Official Website, available 
at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/67/L.48/Rev.1&Lang=E. Accessed 22nd 
August, 2014. 
75
 For the complete listing of these outcomes see UN Sustainable Development Goals Official Website, 
available at 
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/4518SDGs_FINAL_Proposal%20of%20OW
G_19%20July%20at%201320hrsver3.pdf. Accessed 22nd August, 2014. The document was reviewed at 
the close of the 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2014. Final 
confirmation of the list of targets and indicators associated with the Sustainable Development Goals 
will be confirmed in September 2015. 
76
 The only OECD country submission to the global partnership-focused section of the Open Working 
Group came failed to mention this target. See UN Sustainable Development Goals Official Website, 
  
 27 
good governance and the rule of law in fostering development developed country support was 
counter-balanced by developing country resistance.77 Whereas in the case of the MDGs the 
tightly-controlled drafting process led to the creation of a framework lacking clearly 
delineated lines of responsibility, the more open SDG drafting process has culminated in a 
markedly different end-point. Covering the theme of global partnership, SDG 17 includes a 
GLUHFW FDOO WR GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV WR µIXOO\ LPSOHPHQW WKHLU FRPPLWPHQWV WR SURYLGH 
SHUFHQW *'3 WR GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV¶ FRYHULQJ WKH WKHPH RI DFFRXQWDEOH DQG LQFOXVLYH
institutions 6'*  FDOOV IRU GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV WR µVXEVWDQWLDOO\ UHGXFH FRUUXSWLRQ DQG
EULEHU\«DQGGHYHORSWUDQVSDUHQWLQVWLWXWLRQV¶78  
 Viewed holistically, the interactions that have occurred within and around MDG 
review summits have, over time, created a push towards a strategic clarification of the 
benchmarking system. The diffuse lines of responsibility layered in to the benchmarking 
intervention by its architects were initially reinforced by developing country governments, 
through their low level of engagement with the Goals in national development strategies. 
However, with the launch of the Sustainable Development Goals, the pushes that emerged for 
more clearly delineated responsibilities on overseas development assistance and governance 
reform have recently been incorporated into the follow-on version of this most prominent of 
benchmarking initiatives.  
 
Conclusion 
Benchmarking is widely acknowledged to be an inherently political form of intervention. 
Having gained a high degree of prominence across the community of international 
development practitioners and scholars since their launch in 2001, the Millennium 
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Development Goal benchmarking initiative has over the years attracted much comment and 
analysis. In the lead up to the final census year of 2015, this level of attention has increased 
further. Through this paper, I have contributed to this MDG-related literature by presenting an 
empirically-focused exploration of agent-level dynamics surrounding the initiative. The 
insights generated through the paper are founded on new analysis of archival material from 
UN reviews of the MDGs undertaken in 2008 and 2013, and of the content of a series of 
national development plans as presented in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. 
 Through my analysis of this material, I outlined the existence of prominent blame 
games around the Millennium Development Goals. To explore this intersection between 
blame games and benchmarking in global development, I brought observations from this case 
together with existing literature on blame games and benchmarking. Through this process a 
four-part typology was created, which differentiated between benchmarking modes according 
to the nature of the lines of responsibility that were layered in to the system at the point of 
design, and whether there was stability or change in the nature of these lines of responsibility 
over time. Initially, the MDG architects incorporated diffuse lines of responsibility in to the 
framework. Challenges to this opacity began to emerge through UN reviews, with pressure 
emerging in particular for clearer lines of responsibility in the realms of overseas 
development assistance and domestic governance reform. With the superseding of the 
Millennium Development Goals with the Sustainable Development Goals, this push has been 
consolidated. As such, viewed holistically, the MDGs can be seen to have followed the mode 
of strategic clarification.   
Beyond this embedding of calls for strategic clarifications initiated within MDG 
review processes, a number of additional important changes have occurred with the 
emergence of the Sustainable Development Goals. Perhaps most intriguingly, by extending 
the coverage of the framework from a limited sub-section of lower-income states to all 
members of the UN system, the SDGs will challenge an entrenched dichotomy between 
µGHYHORSHG¶FRXQWULHV WRZKRPGHYHORSPHQWSUHVFULSWLRQVDQG\DUGVWLFNV do not apply, and 
µGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV¶WRZKRPWKH\GR:KHQDOLJQHGZLWKLWVLQFOXVLRQRIFDOOVto prioritise 
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the income growth of the poorest 40 percent of domestic populations, SDG prescriptions can 
be seen to cut against the grain of contemporary distributional trends in many countries. As 
was the case with the MDGs, blame games and processes of contestation will determine 
which, if any, of the many targets and indicators associated with the SDGs gain traction 
across national and international policymaking processes. 
The existing academic literature on the Millennium Development Goal framework 
provides valuable explorations of the power relations that were reflected in and (re-)produced 
by this benchmarking initiative. While presenting important insights, the high level of 
abstraction within much of this literature served to underplay the role of agency and agent-
level interactions in shaping the politics of the Millennium Development Goals.79 Here, I have 
extended the MDG-related literature by systematically exploring the agent-level blame games 
that have accompanied the MDGs. Through the examined interactions, developed-country 
representatives were found to have sheeted home responsibility for under-performance to 
their developing-country counter-parts, and developing-country representatives were found 
very much to have returned the favour. With the incorporation of clarifications on aid- and 
governance reform-related benchmarks in WKH 6'* IUDPHZRUN ERWK VLGHV¶ FDOOV DUH EHLQJ
carried forward into the post-2015 initiative. 
In important respects, the elite-level blame games that took place in and around the 
UN headquarters building represent a starting point in the politics of MDG and SDG global 
development benchmarking interventions. Throughout the lifetime of the MDGs, UN review 
summits provided a location in which strategic clarification of the lines of responsibility took 
place at dispersed intervals. Domestic political constellations across the global South 
provided locations in which parallel contests, undoubtedly, took place at a much greater level 
of frequency. These domestic blame games remained by and large off the radar of 
International Studies scholarship. With the SDGs¶ enhanced focus on governance reform, 
accountability, and transparency, it is likely that the domestic blame games surrounding the 
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post-2015 benchmarking exercise will be played with equal or greater levels of intensity. In 
order to extend our understanding of the intersection between blame games and 
benchmarking in global development, it is important that these coming interactions are 
subjected to a more complete examination.         
